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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

According to newspaper articles appearing November 22nd, one of the not
able events of the preceding day was that the United States supreme court had
rendered thirty-one decisions, an unprecedented number for one day. Several
of the decisions were of great importance. In the summary of recent rulings,
published herewith, we have quoted nine of these decisions which relate to
federal income taxes. When the highest court in our scheme of government
renders a decision, its ruling is of first importance, because it is the final word
and is the law.
One question of importance that was definitely answered November 21st is
that “the United States board of tax appeals has full reviewing jurisdiction
over the findings of the commissioner in special-assessment cases and may
compel the commissioner under subpoena to answer interrogatories and furnish
information concerning the returns of other corporate taxpayers.” This deci
sion was rendered in the Osterlein Machine Company case, but the question as
to whether or not this taxpayer is entitled to relief is still to be considered by the
board of tax appeals.
It seems to us that the more important question of whether or not it lies
solely within the discretion of the commissioner as to what taxpayers can be
granted relief under sections 327 and 328 has not been settled. We believe,
however, that the means have been established by which a taxpayer can de
termine whether or not the commissioner is exercising his discretionary powers
in accordance with the intent of congress, as set forth in the provisions of the
relief sections.
At the time when congress adopted the relief provisions it was obviously the
intention that one or more taxpayers in any given business should not be
obliged to pay profits taxes wholly disproportionate to the average paid by its
competitors, and that, if in following the stipulated rules for determining these
taxes a disproportion should result, the taxpayer affected should have a tax
assessed in accordance with the average assessed against its competitors. It
is presumable that congress believed that the taxpayers themselves would raise
the question and that when the question was raised the commissioner would
determine from trustworthy statistics available to him whether or not there
was such a disproportion. It seems an absurd assumption that congress in
tended to leave the whole matter within the discretion of the commissioner,
even though the language of the particular sections so indicates. It would
appear that if this were left entirely discretionary with him there would be no
relief granted to anyone without considerable criticism from congress itself,
for the latter has not hesitated to make it apparent to the commissioner at the
time of its investigation of the bureau of internal revenue, that he has little, if
any, discretion in interpreting the language of the several acts.
An interesting side light upon this matter is furnished by an article in the
December issue of Internal Revenue News contributed by Leslie Gillis, member
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of the special advisory committee. Among other thoughts expressed by Mr.
Gillis is the following:

“ The legislative history of the so-called relief provisions of the various
acts clearly shows that it was the intent of congress to grant relief in those
cases where, owing to some abnormal condition in income or capital, the
taxpayer would suffer a hardship of inequality as compared with other
concerns similarly circumstanced but operating under normal business
conditions, and it was left within the discretion of the commissioner to
determine when exceptional hardship was being worked upon a taxpayer.”

So far as can be discovered no one has heard of a case of relief granted a tax
payer under section 210 of the 1917 act or sections 327 and 328 of the sub
sequent acts where the question was not initiated by the taxpayer.
The commissioner’s apparent attitude upon every other moot question in
volving some possible saving to the taxpayer has been such as to compel the
taxpayer to initiate the question and prove his right to the reduction; so why
should the taxpayer suppose that if his profits taxes were apparently dispro
portionate to those paid by his competitors, the commissioner would diligently
seek to relieve him of the excess amount of such taxes? After some nine years’
experience in federal tax matters, it is too much to expect of the commissioner
and of his bureau, unless there has been some miraculous regeneration of spirit
manifested in that organization.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
The deduction of a loss by reason of worthless stock is not to be disallowed
on the ground that the corporation has not completed the sale of its assets and
the liquidation of its business. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit,
Royal Packing Company v. Commissioner.)
Gain or loss resulting from the sale of stock acquired during 1918 by a
residuary legatee under a will should be computed on the basis of fair market
value of the stock as of the date upon which it was distributed to such residuary
legatee, and not the value of the stock at date of death as contended by the
commissioner. The stock was distributed pursuant to a written instru
ment executed before the will had been filed for probate, under which the
executors and trustees under the will who were residuary legatees set over, as
signed and delivered to each residuary legatee his proportionate share of the
residuary estate, each legatee receipting therefor, and not when stock certificates
were issued by the corporation in their names. (U. S. court of claims, F. W.
Matthiessen, Jr., v. United States.)
The same item can not be made to serve as a part of the value of the gross
estate for estate-tax purposes and also as a part of gross income of the estate
for income-tax purposes. (U. S. court of claims, Executors of estate of John
W. T. Nichols v. United States.)
The right to receive from a partnership the distributive share to which a
decedent was entitled was held to pass to the executors as an asset of the estate
and the amount when ascertained and paid was not taxable income to the estate.
(U. S. court of claims, Executors of estate of John W. T. Nichols v. United States.)
Manufacturer and seller of soft drinks and beverages held liable with respect
to beverage tax, act of 1918, for 10% of full sales price which purported to in
clude the tax since petitioner failed to bill the goods with the price and the tax
stated separately, as required by the regulations. (U. S. court of claims, Lash's
Products Co. v. United States.)
Commissioner’s action approved with respect to the exclusion from invested
capital for 1917 of a fund represented by certain debenture notes issued to the
stockholders on the grounds that the notes represented borrowed money.
(U. S. court of claims, I. Unterberg & Co., Inc., v. United States.)
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A stock dividend declared in 1919, the amount of which exceeded the amount
of undistributed earnings accumulated since March 1, 1913, was not a distribu
tion of profits, and a cash dividend declared thereafter was held taxable since
the amount thereof did not exceed amount of undistributed earnings accumu
lated since March 1, 1913. (U. S. court of claims, Anna Louise Nolde v.
United States.)
Taxpayer held not entitled to deduct as a business expense the cost of im
provements made to the leased property which it occupied. (U. S. court of
claims, National City Bank of Seattle v. United States.)
Interest accrued but not yet due, as of the date of death, upon bank ac
counts, bonds, notes, etc., owned by the decedent who reported income on a
cash receipts and disbursements basis, constituting a part of the estate for
estate-tax purposes, may not also be included as income to the estate, reporting
on the cash receipts and disbursements basis, when paid and received by the
estate. . . . (U. S. court of claims, Executor of estate of Robert H. Jenkins v.
United States.)
In computing the taxable net income of a beneficiary receiving the entire
net income of one half of a residuary estate during her natural life, undiminished
by amount of depreciation taken by trustees on the return of the estate, she
may not deduct therefrom under the 1918 act one half of the depreciation de
ducted on the return of the estate. (U. S. court of claims, Mary Roxburghe v.
United States.)
Corporation held to be “carrying on or doing business" and, therefore, sub
ject to capital-stock tax under act of 1921 where it had disposed of its manu
facturing assets and goodwill but continued to maintain its corporate entity,
and engaged in business transactions (beyond the necessary ones to final
liquidation) for profit, which were designed to facilitate the successful conduct
of the corporation in which it owned a controlling interest. (U. S. court of
claims, Chevrolet Motor Co. v. United States.)
Under the act of 1926 the right of individual persons to recover taxes paid
under section 218 of acts of 1918 and 1921, as stockholders of a personal-service
corporation, which was later denied such classification, rests upon and is gov
erned solely by the provision of section 1210 of the act of 1926, which specifically
covers such cases, and recovery therefore can not be had when, as required by
that section, the tax upon the income involved has not been paid by the cor
poration. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit, James A. Haight, Jr.,
as trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of George B. Hall and the marital community
of George B. Hall and Hazel T. Hall, his wife v. United States.)
Withdrawals during 1917 by a partner as “salary” under an agreement be
tween the partners are not subject to excess-profits taxes, where the partnership
sustained a loss for that year. (U. S. court of claims, Selwyn Bywater v. United
States.)
Amount left by will as full payment for “acting as my executor" is not a
non-taxable bequest but taxable income to the recipient. (U. S. court of ap
peals, second circuit, Robert C. Ream v. Frank K. Bowers, collector.)
The board of tax appeals has full reviewing jurisdiction over the findings of
the commissioner in special assessment cases and may compel the commissioner
under subpoena to answer interrogatories and furnish information concerning
the returns of other corporate taxpayers. (U. S. supreme court, David H.
Blair, commissioner, v. Osterlein Machine Co.)
Income of a non-Indian lessee, derived between 1917 and 1921 from the lease
of restricted Indian lands is not tax exempt. (U. S. supreme court, D. B.
Heiner, collector, v. The Colonial Trust Co., executor of the will of Glenn T.
Braden, deceased.)
Taxpayer sustaining a loss by reason of his prepayment to a seller who had
contracted to deliver merchandise to him is not required to deduct his loss as a
“worthless debt” under sec. 234 (4), act of 1918, but is entitled to deduct it as
a “loss" under sec. 234 (5) of that act. (U. S. supreme court, C. G. Lewellyn,
collector, v. Election Reduction Co.)
Gift-tax provisions of 1924 act held unconstitutional in so far as they under
take to impose a tax because of gifts made during January, 1924, the act not
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being passed until June second of that year. (U. S. supreme court, John W.
Blodgett v. Charles Holden, collector.)
Earned surplus may not be included in invested capital under the 1918 act
until a prior operating deficit has been made up. (U. S. supreme court,
L. M. Willcuts, collector v. Milton Dairy Co.)
Dividends declared in 1916 and 1917 and paid in 1917 are taxable to the
recipient at 1916 rates where it is affirmatively shown that the corporation de
claring them had no 1917 net profits prior to the payment of such dividends,
there being ample 1916 earnings to cover them. (U. S. supreme court, F. H.
Mason v. C. F. Routzahn, collector.)
Dividends are “received” under sec. 31 (b), act of 1916, as amended by the
act of 1917, in the year paid and not in the year declared. Dividends de
clared in 1916 and paid in 1917, are income to the recipient in the year paid.
(U. S. supreme court, F. H. Mason v. C. F. Routzahn, collector.)
Literal compliance with the requirement of the regulations established
pursuant to the statute that “ all facts relied upon in support of the claim (for
refund) shall be clearly set forth under oath” may properly be waived by
counsel for the government in a suit brought by a taxpayer for a recovery of a
tax upon grounds other than those stated in such claim. (U. S. supreme court,
W. C. Tucker v. Acel C. Alexander, collector.)
Courts have jurisdiction to try questions of tax liability de novo, the decision
of the commissioner not being conclusive as to such liability. (U. S. supreme
court, Jessie L. Wickwire, individually and as executrix and trustee under the last
will and testament of Edward L. Wickwire, deceased, v. Mabel G. Reinecke as
collector and acting collector.)
Where the evidence established with somewhat more than reasonable cer
tainty that stock had become worthless in 1921 and was properly deductible in
that year, the owner was not required to dispose of it, and the fact that the
state banking authorities had not required it to be written off or that the
corporation continued as a going concern without being adjudged as a bank
rupt, does not prejudice the owner. (U. S. district court, N. D. Ohio, The
Commerce Guardian Trust and Savings Bank v. Charles H. Nauts, collector.)
Stock received from a prior decedent within five years sold by the executor
to provide cash to pay various administrative expenses, the estate being ample
to pay all such expenses, is deductible from gross estate as property previously
taxed. (U. S. district court, Massachusetts, L. Cushing Kimball, executor v.
Thomas W. White.)
The exchange pursuant to an arrangement of stock received from a decedent
dying within five years, for new shares of stock of the corporation upon pay
ment of an additional subscription, prevents the tracing of the old shares into
any specific number of new shares and the identification of the new shares as
acquired in exchange for property previously taxed. (U. S. district court,
Massachusetts, L. Cushing Kimball v. Thomas W. White.)
Munitions taxes accrued in 1916 should be deducted in 1916 by a corpora
tion keeping books and making its 1916 return substantially on the accrued
basis, even though no reserve for such taxes was set up in 1916 because of the
taxpayer’s uncertainty as to whether the product was subject to such tax.
(U. S. district court, Aluminum Castings Co. v. C. F. Routzahn, collector.)
A refund may not be credited against an uncollected tax outlawed by the
statute of limitations then in force, nor may an outlawed tax be collected by
distraint. (U. S. district court, Massachusetts, James C. Brady and Arthur
Lyman v. United States.)
A taxpayer must allege clearly, in a suit for recovery of excess-profits and
income taxes, wherein the assessment was erroneous and what the correct as
sessment should have been, the allegation that the commissioner, who refused
to compute the tax under section 327 and 328, act of 1918, used a wrong method
being insufficient. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, fifth circuit, Atlantic Casket
Co. v. J. T. Rose, collector.)
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